University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1991

Book Review: Liberty, Property, and the Future of
Constitutional Development. Ellen Frankel Paul
and Howard Dickman, Eds.; Judicial Power and
Reform Politics: The Anatomy of Lochner V. New
York. by Paul Kens.
Herbert Hovenkamp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hovenkamp, Herbert, "Book Review: Liberty, Property, and the Future of Constitutional Development. Ellen Frankel Paul and
Howard Dickman, Eds.; Judicial Power and Reform Politics: The Anatomy of Lochner V. New York. by Paul Kens." (1991).
Constitutional Commentary. 405.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/405

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

274

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE
STITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT.
and Howard Dickman,2 eds. Albany:
York Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 340. Cloth,

[Vol. 8:274

FUTURE OF CONEllen Frankel Pault
State Univ. of New
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JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLmCS: THE
ANATOMY OF LOCHNER v. NEW YORK. By Paul
Kens.3 Lawrence, KS.: Univ. Press of Kansas. 1990. Pp.
232. Cloth, $29.95.
Herbert Hovenkamp4
These two volumes offer new perspectives on a familiar topic in
constitutional history and theory. The first volume is a collection of
essays about the proper scope of constitutional protection of economic liberties. The second is a long-needed historical study of the
decision that has been treated as epitomizing the Supreme Court's
position on these rights during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era:
Lochner v. New York (1905).
The essays in the Paul-Dickman volume are well balanced,
with perspectives from right, left, and center-and, pleasantly, with
authors who actually engage one another in debate. James M.
Buchanan's essay on "The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberialism" states what has become a kind of constitutional orthodoxy
for the judicial activist new right: the property and due process
clauses of the Constitution should be interpreted to protect economic rights, and these rights are best given effect in a regime of
free exchange. Voluntary exchanges are a product of unanimous
consent, and injure no one provided there are no third party effects.
This is the kind of regime, Buchanan argues, that people operating
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would adopt, for it maximizes
both efficiency and human freedom. This suggests to Buchanan
that such institutions as labor unions are bad (he does not exactly
say that they are unconstitutional) because they prevent laborers
from bargaining individually for wages and force them to accept the
I. Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State University; Deputy Director,
Social Philosophy and Policy Center.
2. Research Associate, Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State
University.
3. Assistant Professor, Political Science, Southwest Texas State University.
4. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
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bargain of the collective. In addition, nothing forces the union
members to share their gains with those laborers who become unemployed as a result of the general wage increase. People operating
behind a veil of ignorance, Buchanan asserts, would not select such
a bargaining regime. Buchanan does not address the fact that business firms are largely collectives, formally treated as persons by the
law of corporations. A labor union could organize as a corporation,
with each shareholder pledged to sell her labor to the corporation,
which would in tum sell it to any employer at a uniform price. Presumably, Buchanan would proclaim such an arrangement a subterfuge. But the individual stockholders in a large manufacturing
corporation are in an analogous position on the other side of the
table.
Mark Tushnet follows with a radically different perspective on
the relationship between property and the Constitution. He begins
with a point that has been made before but is worth making again:
the theory of regulatory "capture," now the darling of the public
choice schools, was really a creation of the Left, not the Right. Further, not even the Constitution itself is exempt. In the case of the
Constitution, the theory of regulatory capture derives, of course,
from Charles Beard's controversial Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution (1913 ). The citation to Beard suggests an important
point that Tushnet himself fails to make: any argument that one
should use the Constitution to protect property owners from legislatures captured by special interest groups must consider that the
Constitution itself was the product of a kind of capture. The reason
we have the contract clause and the takings clause in the first place,
Beard argued, was that the Constitutional Convention was dominated by property holders and creditors rather than the unpropertied and debtors. Owners of securities from public debts incurred
during and after the Revolution and private creditors who feared
state debtor relief laws wanted strong protection of both contract
and property. They controlled the drafting and ratification
processes. The unpropertied, by contrast, were not permitted to
vote by the ratifying states and generally were not qualified to be
delegates or to participate in the ratifying conventions. Those who
would interpret special interest legislation narrowly should practice
what they preach when they interpret the Constitution itself.
Lino Graglia's essay attacking "Judicial Activism of the
Right" is by far the angriest in this volume, but it is also compelling. Graglia has no respect for Warren Era liberals, particularly
Justice Brennan, who freely used their own ideology rather than the
Constitution itself as the source of constitutional rights. But con-
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servative noninterpretivists such as Richard Epstein are equally
wrongheaded, he argues, when they rewrite the contract clause, the
takings clause, and other clauses in order to protect a more expansive concept of economic rights from legislative encroachment. On
judicial review, Graglia's position is most like that of Holmes or
James Bradley Thayer,s who would invalidate legislation only
where the constitutional language was clearly inconsistent with the
language of the statute or rule under consideration.
Stephen Macedo disagrees with both Graglia and Epstein in
"Economic Liberties and the Future of Constitutional Self-Government." Unlike Graglia, he favors relatively expansive judicial review for the protection of property and contract rights. But he
faults Epstein's analysis as too explicitly economic, and "only
vaguely derived" from the text of the Constitution. More importantly, Macedo argues, Epstein devotes his attention to a few
clauses of the Constitution (commerce, contract, takings) and never
really attempts to interpret the text as a whole. "[O]nce one begins
interpreting parts of the Constitution in terms of the whole, including its broad language and implicit ends and purposes, it becomes
harder to find bright lines and clear rules." It particularly becomes
"difficult to justify the blanket judgment" of Epstein's book on Takings 6 "that all transfers are, in principle, unconstitutional."
Frank Michelman then argues in "Tutelary Jurisprudence and
Constitutional Property" that the constitutional perspective on
property rights is far more malleable and indeterminate than the
Right would have us believe. Credible arguments can be made for
both a republican constitutional vision, which looks to the popular
will, and a liberal vision, which regards persons as having absolute,
or "pre-political," rights. Likewise, the line between traditional
"negative" property rights, such as the right to exclude the world or
to use one's property for one's own benefit, and newer "positive"
rights, such as welfare entitlements, is not demarcated with any precision. "[O]ne simply can't, at least not while thinking or talking as
an insider to American constitutionalism, quite abandon either pole
of the liberal/republican axis." Even if one could, that "would
leave unresolved the problem of negative-vs.-affi.rmative rights."
Epstein responds to Graglia, Macedo, and Michelman in "Takings: Of Maginot Lines and Constitutional Compromises." But the
brunt of his attack goes against Graglia, whom he accuses of criti5. Eg., Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
6. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN (1985).
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cizing all common uses of judicial review without offering any substitute theory of his own. He thinks it naive of Graglia to argue that
one must conduct judicial review without the benefit of political
theory. The plain language of the Constitution simply does not answer every question, and interpretation and theory are necessary to
fill in the gaps.
Although Graglia's position is simple, it may be more subtle
than Epstein acknowledges. Graglia argued that in those cases
where the Constitution's meaning must be "filled in" and more than
one interpretation is rational, it is for legislators, not judges, to
choose among the interpretations. To be sure Graglia's view would
roll back judicial review a century, to the pre-Lochner period, but
his position was in fact quite respectable for some time in the middle decades of the nineteenth century: the Constitution's more general or hortatory clauses-such as due process, takings, and free
exercise-may have many meanings depending on one's ideology.
In such cases, Graglia argued, the judge's duty is to permit the legislature to interpret the Constitution.
In a short essay on "Civil Rights and Property Rights," William H. Riker argues in somewhat idiosyncratic fashion that the
Supreme Court's elevation of civil rights over property rights is indefensible. In fact, the two kinds of rights have similar origins and
functions in classical liberal political theory. Riker's point may be
provable, but probably not by the method he chose. Riker simply
takes a few examples of rights-free speech as a civil right and airport landing slots as a property right-and provides a brief
thumbnail history of each, designed to show that the rights developed through a bargaining process involving self-interested grantors
and grantees. But these three pages of history, citing only a few
sources, certainly do not prove that "civil and property rights originate in the persistent demands of potential beneficiaries, and in the
calculations of granting officials that satisfying petitioners is less
costly than resisting them," or that "civil and property rights have
historically similar origins." A "public choice" constitutional history remains to be written.
In "The Politics of the New Property: Welfare Rights in Congress and the Courts," R. Shep Melnick argues that although the
Court's creation of federal welfare rights, particularly under
AFDC, was superficially a result of statutory construction, the
Court's interpretations actually related only loosely to the language
and congressional intent of those statutes. This explains why the
Reagan administration was forced to cut back, in particular by restoring to the states the power to determine eligibility individually.
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The final two essays in this volume concern labor. In "Work,
Government, and the Constitution: Determining the Proper Allocation of Rights and Power," Thomas R. Haggard traces the history of Supreme Court supervision of the employer-employee
relationship for more than a century. Haggard finds his own history to be inconclusive, but observes that the Court seems to have
moved from a rather clearly defined natural rights premise during
the Lochner era at the tum of the century to a much more pragmatic, situational position today. But more importantly, Haggard
argues, the Supreme Court has always played super-legislature on
the subject of employee rights. The criticisms of the Lochner-era
Court for substituting its own judgments for those of the legislatures whose statutes it struck down were certainly well founded.
But what the Court has done since the New Deal is, in this respect
no different. Finally, Leo Troy argues in "The Right to Organize
Meets the Market" that the New Deal and post-New Deal judicial
effort to shift bargaining power toward labor unions has failed, not
because of legislation, but because the market itself has deprived the
unions of their powerful position. The power of private sector unions has declined substantially since the 1970s. Public sector unions
have not generally met the same fate, for public leaders are not "accountable" for higher labor costs in the same way that competitive
firms are.
Paul Kens's book on Lochner attempts to be a comprehensive
history of the famous case. He gives a lively account of working
conditions in New York bakeries and of the legislative battle that
produced the Lochner statute. Perhaps the statute, which prevented bakers from working more than sixty hours weekly or ten
hours per day, was special interest legislation. But if so, both
houses of the New York legislature were thoroughly captured. The
vote in the lower house was 120 to 0 and in the upper house 20 to 0.
Kens suggests that perhaps the legislators knew of the statute's
health provisions but were unaware of the maximum hours regulations. But this seems most unlikely; the statute is only a little over a
page long, and the very first section opens with the words, "No employee shall be required, permitted or suffered to work in a biscuit,
bread or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than
sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one
day." The health regulations all appear in subsequent sections. At
least some of the 140 legislators must have glanced at the opening
paragraph of the bill they were about to vote on.
Kens's book contains a disappointing discussion of other aspects of the Lochner era. The discussion of judicial decisions is
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much too simple and pedantic. Most of the intellectual and economic history is a heavily derivative, orthodox Progressive critique.
For example, Kens attributes the substantive due process Justices'
anti-statist beliefs to Social Darwinism, not dealing with more recent scholarship suggesting first that Social Darwinism was not as
ubiquitous a political philosophy as we once thought, and secondly
that not only were the Justices not Social Darwinists, most may not
have been Darwinians at all. Kens also overstates the rigidity of the
substantive due process Justices and does not give them sufficient
credit for their great creativity-whatever else it was, Lochner v.
New York was a highly creative piece of constitutional non-interpretivism. Kens's epilogue includes a quick survey of substantive due
process scholarship in the 1980s, but this literature is not well-incorporated into the balance of the text.
Kens concludes by observing that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt wanted to obtain support for his New Deal by putting an
end to the judicial activism represented by Lochner and its progeny.
But his own Court turned out to be far more willing to support the
New Deal than to end judicial activism. Many of Roosevelt's appointees became enthusiastic supporters of the new wave of activism
that began a generation later. In that respect, as many of the essays
in the Paul & Dickman book suggest, the clock may never again be
turned back. Judges, it seems, are inevitably super-legislators, and
economic ideologies are their political parties.

AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM OF
TEXAS PRISONS. By Ben M. Crouch1 and James W. Marquart.2 University of Texas Press. 1989. Pp. 304. Cloth,
$27.50.
David A. Ward 3
This book reports the product of one of those rare occasions
when researchers happen to be on site gathering data before a major
change in policy and practice is imposed on an organization. One
of the authors, Professor Ben Crouch, began a series of studies of
Texas prison officers in 1973, worked briefly as a uniformed officer
himself, and conducted additional studies during 1979 with the
other author, Professor James Marquart, who also worked as a uniI.
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